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Biological market theory has been used successfully to explain cooperative behavior in many animal species. Microbes also engage in
cooperative behaviors, both with hosts and other microbes, that can be described in economic terms. However, a market approach is not
traditionally used to analyze these interactions. Here, we extend the biological market framework to ask whether this theory is of use to
evolutionary biologists studying microbes. We consider six economic strategies used by microbes to optimize their success in markets. We
argue that an economic market framework is a useful tool to generate specific and interesting predictions about microbial interactions,
including the evolution of partner discrimination, hoarding strategies, specialized versus diversified mutualistic services, and the role of spatial
structures, such as flocks and consortia. There is untapped potential for studying the evolutionary dynamics of microbial systems. Market
theory can help structure this potential by characterizing strategic investment of microbes across a diversity of conditions.
cooperation | mutualism | trade | partner choice
A perspective borrowed from another field of
research often offers insights for generating
new hypotheses and approaches (1). Biolog-
ical market theory argues that exchanges of
resources and services among organisms can
be analyzed in market terms, with individuals
making strategic trading investments to max-
imize market gains (2, 3). However, it is un-
known how applicable the theory is across
diverse systems or whether it can be of use
to predict how cooperative strategies evolve.
One area where market theory is particu-
larly useful is in the study of mutualisms:
cooperative interactions between individuals
of different species. A major question in
mutualism research is why organisms pro-
vide benefits to other individuals at a potential
cost to themselves. An important variable
in maintaining mutualisms is the degree to
which an individual can control the fitness of
its partner (4). When both partners retain
control and can actively choose whether or
not to cooperate, exchange processes are more
analogous to human markets because trade
(leverage) operates over force (coercion) (5).
Mutualisms involving microbial partners
are relatively underexplored because actions
and responses can be harder to observe.
However, every species on earth is involved
directly or indirectly in one or more micro-
bial partnerships; some are involved in
hundreds (6). These interactions play an
important role in animal and plant evolution,
ecology, and development (7–9). Microbial
mutualisms exhibit the same characteristics
as other mutualisms, including competition
among multiple partner lineages and a poten-
tial to cheat (10). An essential component of
understanding these systems is determining
what helps to stabilize cooperation between
partners over evolutionary time. This is a
large question, with answers that vary across
mutualistic systems.
A market framework can theoretically be
used to study mutualisms if the following
conditions for biological markets are met
(Box 1 and refs. 2 and 3): (i) commodities
(goods or services) must be exchanged be-
tween individuals; (ii) at least two distinct
classes of traders must exist; (iii) individuals
from at least one trader class must be able to
choose or switch partners; and (iv) there
must be individual differences in commodity
price so that there are opportunities for
“outbidding” price competition. Addition-
ally, most markets are also characterized
by (v) temporal variation in supply and de-
mand of the commodities, which can initi-
ate price fluctuations (2, 3).
An important advantage of a market frame-
work is that strategic investment on both
sides of a mutualism can be studied (mul-
tiplayer models), while taking into account
the biological context of the exchange, such
as availability of partners or level of external
resources. The emphasis is on the relative
value of goods and services exchanged and
how this value changes as the biological
context changes. This includes potential
situations where services or goods are of so
little value that it is more beneficial to refrain
from trade.
However, although the market analogy is
appealing, empirical tests of the theory have
focused on animal systems (e.g., refs. 20, 29,
and 31; see Box 1 for more examples). This
focus is a potential problem because we still
do not understand how cognitive abilities
contribute to the emergence of market dy-
namics (32, 33). Advocates of biological mar-
ket theory argue that cognition is not needed
and terms of trade can be explained solely
by the current value of the potential partner
and the context of the exchange (34). The
expectation in market theory is on im-
mediate rewards, not anticipated benefits:
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advantageous responses can evolve without
cognition (35).
If biological markets do not require cog-
nition, we predict that the theory can be ef-
fectively extended to organisms without ner-
vous systems, like microbes. Have microbes
evolved strategies that allow them to dis-
criminate among trading partners? Do mi-
crobial mutualism markets follow the laws
of supply and demand? Although some
pioneering modeling work has been done
in plant–microbial mutualisms (11, 22, 36,
37), these advances have been almost purely
theoretical. However, technological advan-
ces, such as creating cheating mutants or
artificially manipulating investment (e.g.,
ref. 38), now allow us to study cooperation,
and more specifically market dynamics, in
microbes (10).
In this Perspective, we explore the evolu-
tion of market strategies by microbes. We
only consider systems in which at least one of
the two trading partners is microbial. We
discuss microbial market research questions,
such as the evolution of microbial partner
discrimination and the role of environmental
variability on microbial cooperation, and
propose methods to address these questions
(Table 1). Experimental and theoretical study
of such questions will drive forward our
understanding of microbial markets and of
microbial cooperation in general. This includes
potential practical applications of microbial
markets, for instance, in human health or
sustainable agriculture (see Applied Microbial
Markets below). We identify and discuss six
economic strategies important for microbes
to optimize their success in potential biolog-
ical markets: (i) avoid bad trading partners;
(ii) build local business ties; (iii) diversify or
specialize; (iv) become indispensable; (v) save
for a rainy day; and (vi) eliminate the com-
petition. These strategies are not necessarily
mutually exclusive: microbes may use multi-
ple strategies and some microbial behaviors
may correspond to aspects of more than one
strategy. In some cases (e.g., becoming indis-
pensable), it is the coevolution of partners
promoting a market, not necessarily an active
strategy driven by one side. Lastly, although
the ability of at least one trader class to choose
among competing partners is an important
condition for markets to emerge, microbes
can also use strategies that limit market choice
in an effort to gain monopolistic control
(strategies iv and vi). In all cases, strategies
are selected because they benefit the indi-
vidual microbe, or a co-occurring clone of
identical microbes, not because they opti-
mize the market as a whole: choices bene-
ficial to individual traders can have the short-
term effect of restricting options available to
a trading partner. Even though such strategies
can initially limit market dynamics, they
might be restored when new competitors
offering the same service enter the exchange.
Microbial Market Strategies
Strategy One: Avoid Bad Trading Part-
ners. Among the most important require-
ments for a biological market to emerge is for
individuals to be able to discriminate among
a variety of partners (Box 1, condition iii).
Discrimination is the act of evaluating and
comparing trading partners based on their
actual (or perceived) contribution to an in-
teraction (24). This is essential when indi-
viduals interact withmultiple partners because
it allows for simultaneous comparisons of
quality among competitors. For instance, us-
ing a biologicalmarket framework, researchers
have demonstrated how client fish will switch
to better quality cleaners if they are cheated by
a cleaner that feeds on their mucus or scales
(20, 29, 30).
Experimental research in plant–microbe
mutualisms has tested similar ideas, asking
whether plant hosts can detect variation in re-
sources or services provided and respond ac-
cordingly. Such discrimination mechanisms
have been found in legumes, with some
Box 1. Characteristics of biological markets
(i) Exchange of commodities
The most basic element of any (biological) market is the exchange of commodities
between two interacting partners. Commodities can be resources such as nutrients (11)
and services such as grooming (12). In some primate species, mating opportunities are
exchanged for grooming services (13, 14). Aphids exchange honeydew, a nutritious re-
source, for ant-protection services (15, 16). Although biological markets typically involve
the exchange of different commodities, primate-grooming markets are an example in
which the same commodity is provided by both partners (17, 18).
(ii) Distinct classes of traders
Each biological market exchange requires two distinct classes of actors, or trader classes,
both of which have a commodity to offer (2, 3). Trader classes can belong to the same
species as in mating or cooperative breeding markets (13, 19) or to different species
(mutualisms) (20, 21). In mutualistic biological markets, both trader classes have an
advantage over the other class in producing and providing their specialized commodity
(22, 23).
(iii) Choosing and switching partners
In any market, trading partners are chosen from a number of potential partners.
Individuals discriminate, choosing a partner based on differences in the price or quality
of the commodity offered (24). Ants choose aphids producing the highest quality of
honeydew and remunerate them with high-quality protection services (15, 25). Similarly,
in primate-mating markets, males that offer more grooming are rewarded with more
mating opportunities (13, 26). Such economic partner discrimination is the key factor
driving market dynamics (24, 27) and distinguishes biological markets from traditional
two-party, direct-reciprocity models (28). Therefore, only mutualisms that involve
discrimination among partners by one or both trader classes can be considered
biological markets.
(iv) Price differences
Analogous to human markets, competition between individuals within a trading
class can drive down commodity prices in so-called “outbidding competition” (3). In
human economies, this idea manifests as “price wars.” For instance, cleaner fish pro-
vide a higher-quality cleaning service in the presence of other competing cleaner fish
(29, 30).
(v) Supply and demand variation
Supply and demand determine the bartering value of commodities exchanged (2).
Supply and demand are not fixed quantities but are inherently context-dependent and
change over time. For instance, if more food-providing vervet monkeys are introduced in
a population, the grooming services received as payment decrease (31).
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species preferentially supporting rhizobial
symbionts that provide more fixed N2 for
hosts (39–41) and in the arbuscular mycor-
rhizal mutualism in which host plants allo-
cate more carbon resources to fungal strains
providing more nutrient resources (42, 43).
However, can microbes also discriminate
among their hosts? In the mycorrhizal mu-
tualism, an individual fungus (i.e., a single
multicellular genotype) can potentially com-
pare resource allocation of several hosts si-
multaneously because it is connected un-
derground to multiple plants (44, 45).
Research suggests that mycorrhizal fungi
can evaluate the quality of these hosts and
adjust resource allocation patterns accord-
ingly, allowing for market dynamics to
emerge (43, 46, 47). It remains an open
question how this information is integrated
over the fungal network and over what dis-
tances this evaluation can take place.
Discrimination, which involves choosiness
and searching, is generally associated with
costs (27). This implies that for discrimina-
tion ability to evolve there must be (i) suffi-
cient variation in trader quality and (ii) a
fitness benefit for partnering with higher-
quality individuals. Additionally, if discrimi-
nation occurs before actual investment in the
interaction, the potential problem faced by
a discriminating trading partner is that of
“false advertising” (i.e., if a candidate partner
honestly reflects its value as partner) (48, 49).
Recent research addresses how fungi sense
differences in quality (50) and has used
phenotypic plasticity models to ask how
trading strategies are influenced by fluctua-
tions in market conditions such as external
nutrient availability (51).
Strategy Two: Build Local Business Ties.
In a market, your local environment deter-
mines your trade connections. Simultaneous
comparisons are not always possible to
identify the best partners. Nonfilamentous
organisms, such as most bacteria, have fewer
opportunities than filamentous microbes like
mycorrhizal fungi to interact simultaneously
with multiple partners. If direct discrimina-
tion among trading partners is more difficult,
can market conditions still arise?
Theoretical work suggests that spatial
structuring of partners can limit the spread of
less beneficial partners and favor the evolu-
tion of cooperative exchanges (52, 53). This is
because spatial structure offers a way to keep
benefits close to cooperators, rather than
diffusing to others. Similarly, spatial structure
can also potentially promote the origin and
maintenance of microbial markets. Market
theory predicts that the success and stability
of markets will depend on the extent to which
cooperators gain more access to resources
than noncooperators (3). Spatial structure
facilitates the creation of physical connections
to profitable partners, limits diffusion of costly
substances, and reduces the number of po-
tential partners to evaluate compared with
well-mixed environments. As a result, spatial
structure could increase the effectiveness
of partner discrimination, particularly for
nonfilamentous microbes, where such dis-
crimination is otherwise more difficult.
Consequently, a major question is whether
the stability of microbial markets depends
on spatially structured environments (54).
An illustration of the importance of spatial
structure for a potential microbial market was
found in a recent experiment in which co-
operation was evolved de novo in cocultures
of two bacterial species (Salmonella enterica
ser. Typhimurium and Escherichia coli) (55).
In this system, Salmonella facilitated the
growth of its partner by secreting a costly
amino acid, whereas E. coli reciprocated
through processing accumulating waste. Pref-
erential reciprocationof cooperative genotypes
was found to only occur in a spatially struc-
tured (solid) environment, leading to in-
creased densities of both species within 10
generations. In contrast, in unstructured en-
vironments (liquid media), cooperation did
not evolve. This illustrates how novel syn-
thetic markets can arise, given the appro-
priate selective conditions.
If being spatially aggregated is individually
beneficial, physical structures may evolve in
which trade is conducted and maintained.
In a mutualism between sulfur-reducing,
chemotrophic bacteria and phototrophic sul-
phide oxidizers, spatially organized aggregates
called consortia are formed (56, 57), poten-
tially allowing for more controlled resource
flow (56, 58). Likewise, cross-feeding mutual-
isms between hydrogen-producing fermenters
andmethanogens (e.g., in sewage sludge) form
aggregative flocs to retain shared metabolites
(54). Consortia and flocs are common in mi-
crobial communities (58, 59). Such aggrega-
tions may even represent the starting point
for mutualisms in which one organism
Table 1. Research questions relating to the evolution of microbial biological markets
Evolution of Question Suggested approaches
Variation in
partner quality
What is individual variation in market prices? Descriptive; study microbial individuality
Is it influenced by level of competition? Manipulate level of competition; study change in partner quality variation
Can it be used in an applied way? Identify best genotypes for systems useful to humans; use experimental
evolution to generate variation
Partner
discrimination
Can microbes simultaneously evaluate partners and
discriminate?
Track nutrients in networks/aggregates of microbes interacting with
multiple partners
For free-living microbes, can (chemotactic) mobility achieve
discrimination?
Choice experiments between high- and low-quality partners
Is discrimination more likely in multicellular than in
single-celled microbes?
Descriptive studies; compare occurrence of partner discrimination




Do trading partners respond to resource volatility according
to market hypotheses?
Manipulate resources; track effects on microbial trade
What (a)biotic factors influence supply/demand of resources
and affect trade patterns?
Manipulate conditions to increase/decrease value of a resource; track
effects on trade
Hoarding Do microbes hoard resources? Track resource storage, particularly in “farmers”
Do microbes trade hoarded resources at a later stage? Manipulate market conditions so trade is not beneficial; change
supply/demand to see trade increase.







eventually compartmentalizes the other in a
specific structure.
However, the effect of structure on mi-
crobial exchange is not straightforward (60);
benefits of increased spatial structure can
sometimes be negated by the negative effects
of competition among relatives (61, 62). A
second problem is that markets can be par-
asitized by third parties that use metabolites
without contributing to the exchange (63). In
biological markets, traders are predicted to
evolve mechanisms to avoid losses to non-
trading partners. This is particularly impor-
tant in resource-poor environments (64).
Parasitism can potentially be limited if
microbes are able to create direct (physical)
connections to trade resources. Metal-
reducing bacteria like Geobacter sulfurre-
ducens form pili that function as microbial
nanowires (65). These wires probably allow
the transfer of electrons to other Geobacter
species over manifolds the size of bacteria
(66, 67). Although very little is known
about these transfers, this is intriguing be-
cause it suggests a potential mechanism to
direct resources (e.g., electrons) to specific
microbial partners. Other forms of (tem-
porary) adhesion between partners may
likewise direct resource transfer to high-
quality trading partners. More research is
needed to understand how the potential for
directed transfers depends on the microbial
environment, for example, the presence of
dense microbial biofilms vs. simple well-
mixed environments.
Strategy Three: Diversify or Specialize.
In market terms, diversification in com-
modities (i.e., offering multiple services or
goods rather than only a single one) is a
strategy that could reduce exposure to price
volatility. In theory, diversification reduces
risks associated with volatile market con-
ditions, thereby facilitating more consistent
performance under a wider range of con-
ditions. In contrast, through commodity spe-
cialization, a trader can usually offer a good at
a lower price, increasing its chances to outbid
competitors (Box 1, condition iv) (11, 22, 23).
In microbial markets, the individual ad-
vantages of using diversified or specialized
strategies will depend strongly on context
(11, 37). Diversification of services or com-
modities can be favored if this strategy in-
creases the range of environmental condi-
tions over which a trader remains a useful
partner. For instance, the actinobacterial
symbionts of leaf-cutter ants produce anti-
biotics that inhibit Escovopsis, a parasitic
fungus invading fungal gardens (68). Recent
work suggests these symbionts provide a
more diversified service by also providing ant
workers themselves with broad spectrum
protection against infectious fungi, including
entomopathogenic (e.g., Metarhizium aniso-
pliae) infections (69). This dual service can
increase ant incentives to maintain bacterial
communities even in the absence of specific
parasitic threats or direct immune challenges.
In contrast, specialized trade occurs when
a trading partner provides only a single ser-
vice or good and is predicted to be favored
when there is strong competition within
a trader class (i.e., when many competing
traders are offering the same commodity).
This is because organisms often experience
tradeoffs in the acquisition of various re-
sources (22, 23). If there is such a tradeoff,
a specialized microbe offering only one re-
source would be able to offer a better price
for that resource than a microbe offering
multiple resources. In human economics, this
“law of comparative advantage” was first
proposed two centuries ago by David
Ricardo, arguing that it is beneficial to spe-
cialize in the acquisition of one commodity
and obtain the other through trade (70). In
a recently discovered exchange between a ni-
trogen-fixing unicellular cyanobacterium and
a tiny single-celled prymnesiophytes algal
partner (71), the cyanobacterium has lost its
ability to carry out its own photosynthesis
and receives carbon from this specific algal
partner in exchange for fixed N. It is un-
known whether there is a tradeoff between N
fixation and photosynthesis in this cyano-
bacterium. However, this case raises the in-
triguing question of whether through the loss
of photosynthesis, this cyanobacterium can
fix N more efficiently and consequently offer
a better price than other symbiotic cyano-
bacteria or generalist planktonic species com-
peting for algal carbon.
How can market theory generate hypoth-
eses on the evolution of specialized vs. di-
versified services in microbial markets? One
idea is that high dependence on a partner
promotes diversification. By studying or even
synthetically creating microbial trade markets
(e.g., ref. 72) with partners displaying differ-
ent levels of dependency and competition, we
may be able to test empirically when the
benefits of diversification outweigh those of
specialization. A second question is whether
diverse services arise as byproducts or whether
microbial partners are under selection to
vary benefits to hosts? The costs of providing
diverse benefits will be affected by tradeoffs
associated with their provisioning. Di-
versification is predicted to emerge if com-
modities provided by one partner are
positively correlated, whereas specialization
would be favored by a tradeoff in the ac-
quisition of two commodities (22, 23).
Strategy Four: Become Indispensable. In
economics, if a partner is indispensable, the
price it receives is predicted to be high. This
is because by restricting choice an economic
actor can monopolize market exchange (14,
73). From a biological market perspective,
monopolistic control of vital partner func-
tions, such as reproduction, by microbial
mutualists increases their market value. Part-
ners are less likely or able to discontinue trade
because this could result in negative fitness
consequences and even death. Although in-
dispensability cannot always be considered
indicative of an active strategy used by
microbes to command higher prices (i.e.,
it can result from a coevolutionary process
involving both host and microbe or two
microbes), the end result is a monopolistic
position. As in economic markets, microbial
partners still face risks of being undercut
by another microbe offering a better price.
Therefore, the best examples of microbes
using this strategy involve tight physical
ties, for example, those associated with en-
dosymbiosis (e.g., refs. 74 and 75), which
limit the potential for partner switching. If
it is difficult or impossible to switch to an-
other microbe from the environment, the
prevailing partner would occupy a monopo-
listic position and be indispensable.
In some cases, hosts have relied on mi-
crobial mutualisms to such an extent that this
dependency has driven an evolutionary loss
of host traits (76). For example, several genes
involved in amino acid biosynthesis have
been lost in the pea aphid Acyrthosiphon
pisum. These are encoded in the genome of
Buchnera, the aphid’s symbiont (77). Corals
(Acropora sp.) have lost the ability to syn-
thesize cysteine, because this is provided by
their endosymbionts (78). Hundreds of ma-
rine worm species show loss of traits for di-
gestive or excretory systems because of their
evolved dependence on chemosynthetic mi-
crobes for digestion (79). The microbes
benefit from protection and are provided
with a suitable habitat, whereas the host is
able to survive on inorganic energy and car-
bon sources, allowing them to flourish in
harsh conditions (80). As a result of vital trait
loss, these microbial symbionts become fully
indispensable to their hosts. An important
research question, although empirically chal-
lenging, is to test whether indispensable
microbial partners command higher prices
compared with symbioses where the host is
not fully dependent on its microbial partners.
This effect would only be predicted to occur
in cases where the potential for switching to
another microbial partner is limited. Without
such limitations, indispensability of indi-
vidual microbes driving up prices could be
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counteracted by outbidding competition by
microbes from the environment.
Strategy Five: Save for a Rainy Day.
Careful management of resources is impor-
tant for traders engaged in market exchange.
This can mean saving resources for future
trade, rather than consuming or trading im-
mediately. Humans and some other animals
practice such management in agriculture or
food storage where a portion of material is
maintained rather than consumed (81, 82),
so it can be propagated for subsequent gen-
erations, or sold later at a better price. We
expect such hoarding of market resources for
future trade if three conditions apply: (i) the
supply of the resource is volatile to such an
extent that there are periods of luxury supply
(i.e., the trader can afford not to use it all);
(ii) there is volatility in demand from the
other trader class; and (iii) it is storable.
Microbes can also practice prudent man-
agement of resources and even increase their
capital, like some animals. For example, there
is evidence that rather than providing hosts
with phosphorus, some mycorrhizal fungal
strains can store the phosphorus nutrients
they have collected or keep them in a form
inaccessible to hosts (43, 83). Such specula-
tion with resources potentially allows a fungal
partner to gain a better carbon price for
their nutrients, as soil nutrient levels be-
come depleted.
The social amoeba Dictyostelium dis-
coideum has been shown to farm bacteria
before consuming them. For most of their
life cycle, D. discoideum consume bacteria via
phagocytosis and divide by binary fission, but
under starvation conditions, they aggregate
into a multicellular slug that differentiates to
contain a sterile stalk, as well as hardy spores
(84). About one-third ofD. discoideum clones
carry bacteria through the normally sterile
spore stage and then release the bacteria to
propagate them in an environment where
they proliferate. Once the bacteria reach
sufficient densities in the favorable habitat,
the amoeba farmers consume the bacterial
crop (85). Farming strains devoured fewer
than half the bacteria present, whereas
nonfarmers consumed nearly all of the
bacteria (85). This illustrates that microbes
(whether or not they are active traders) are
able to prudently save resources for future
use, which may be important for microbial
markets to evolve. This strategy is most
likely to evolve in microbial markets con-
sisting of a larger partner using a smaller
one (e.g., amoeba–bacteria interactions).
More generally, farming strategies are likely
to evolve when there is a larger partner that
is dependent on harvesting or milking a
smaller one (e.g., refs. 82 and 86). Future
work should determine whether volatility in
market demand or in resource abundance
are indeed factors promoting hoarding of
resources for future trade.
Strategy Six: Eliminate the Competition.
Although direct elimination of competition is
a deviation from biological market assump-
tions, antagonism against other individuals in
one’s trader class can help secure favorable
trade conditions for the individual using
them (2, 3). For example, monopolistic con-
trol of chacma baboon mating markets
through competitor suppression by alpha
males has been observed (14). When costs
of directly suppressing competitors are small
or competition is intense, these types of an-
tagonistic strategies are likely to be favored
over outbidding competition. Coercion rather
than leverage becomes the dominant force
driving trade. However, if competitors are
completely eliminated, market dynamics will
disappear because the only trader left be-
comes a monopolist.
To eliminate competitors directly and se-
cure greater market control, microbes could
use a variety of strategies, including bacte-
riocin production (52, 87, 88). Bacteriocins
are a class of toxins produced by bacteria to
inhibit competing strains. Microbes produce
bacteriocins that typically target closely re-
lated rather than distantly related strains
within the same species, because these are
most likely to compete for similar resources
(89, 90). In this way, competing strains can
be eliminated, and the bacteriocin producer
can achieve a resource monopoly. To avoid
targeting related clones, kin-recognition sys-
tems, like toxin–antidote systems, are often
used (91). For example, E. coli deploys toxins
to eliminate competing strains, while using
immunity genes specific to these toxins to
protect itself (92).
In leaf-cutter fungal gardens, resident ba-
sidiomycete fungi produce incompatibility
compounds that effectively kill intruding fun-
gal strains, and this antagonistic interac-
tion increases with increasing genetic distance
(93). Worker ants also help distribute toxins
that prevent alien fungi from establishing.
This is possible because antagonistic com-
pounds of fungal origin are ingested by ants
when feeding on the resident fungus and be-
come part of the fecal droplets that ants use to
fertilize fungus gardens (94). Application of
such droplets to alien tissue generally elimi-
nates alien fungi (93). By eliminating com-
peting alien strains, the resident fungus thus is
able to monopolize the ant host leaf supply,
securing a greater share of the resources pro-
vided to the fungal gardens.
The mutualism between insect-killing
Xenorhabdus bacterial symbionts and ento-
mopathogenic Steinernema nematodes is a
potentially useful system to study competi-
tion in a market framework (95–97). Xen-
orhabdus bovienii use toxins to kill insects
in which the nematode reproduces. When
nematodes migrate to find new insect prey,
they take only a few clones of X. bovienii
(97), and thus competition for migrating
nematode hosts is intense. X. bovienii
clones use bacteriocins to ensure access
to migrating host resources (95–97). Initial
work on field populations suggests that,
in line with predictions (e.g., ref. 89),
bacteriocins most strongly mediate intra-
specific competition but that they also
play a role in mediating coexisting spe-
cies (97). Because of intense within-trader
class competition in this system, competi-
tion is expected to be strong and antag-
onistic strategies to control market access
are likely to evolve.
Discussion and Perspectives
Although research on microbial social inter-
actions has greatly expanded in recent years,
there has been a limited attempt to study
microbial exchange systems using a market
framework. Studies on microbial markets
have either been purely theoretical (11, 22,
23, 36, 37), whereas more empirical work has
only tested these ideas in plant root mutual-
isms (40, 42, 43, 49, 98). We argue that bi-
ological market theory can help structure
how we interpret and explain the wide
range of collaborative behaviors performed
by microbes, generating new hypotheses and
approaches in social microbiology. At the
same time, we recognize that it is still un-
known whether a substantial number of
microbial mutualisms fully conform to the
conditions for biological markets (Box 1).
Consequently, it will remain difficult to assess
the importance of microbial markets before
more research explicitly evaluating trade in
microbes is performed. Below we address
some specific questions that help answer
this question.
Regardless of the actual importance in
natural conditions, microbial systems are
incredibly amenable to study markets: (i)
resources can be easily manipulated; (ii) re-
source exchange can be quantitatively tracked;
(iii) and short generation times mean that
market changes can be studied on an evo-
lutionary time scale (experimental evolu-
tion). These advantages also mean that
microbial systems can potentially be used to
test longstanding questions in biological
market theory, including how prices are
set in nature, how environmental variation







influences trade strategies, or the impor-
tance of false vs. honest advertising. An-
other valuable contribution will be to study
microbial markets and compare them to
animal markets (Box 1). This could help us
to determine which, if any, market features
are specific to cognitive agents (34, 35).
Experimental evolution approaches can be
particularly useful for studying microbial
markets because they can circumvent the
difficulties in inferring adaptations from
behaviors exhibited by naturally evolved
microbes. Below, we propose some ques-
tions that warrant particular attention and
may be successfully approached using
a microbial market framework (Table 1).
Evolution of Variation in Partner Quality.
An important assumption of biological mar-
ket theory is that there is sufficient individual
variation in partner quality to make choosi-
ness worthwhile. Hence, a key step to un-
derstanding the evolution of microbial mar-
kets is the notion of individual variation in
partner quality. Advances in the study of
microbial individuality have revealed that the
typical population-level focus in microbiol-
ogy can mask the existence of different phe-
notypes in microbial communities (99, 100).
Individuality (i.e., cell-to-cell phenotypic var-
iability) of bacteria is an important factor
driving microbial ecology and evolution (101,
102). Future research should aim to study
this phenotypic variation between microbial
individuals, particularly in terms of trading
partner quality. The study of such variation,
particularly the identification of beneficial
strains, is also of practical application for
mutualistic systems (e.g., rhizobial and my-
corrhizal mutualisms) that can be better
optimized for human benefit (103).
How Does Partner Discrimination Evolve?
A key element of any market is that dis-
crimination among partners is based on the
benefit they provide. In mycorrhizal mutu-
alisms, there is a potential for this to evolve
because individuals are able to simulta-
neously monitor and compare resource flows
to and from different trading partners in
a single trading network (43, 46). In free-
living microbes, there is less potential for
such simultaneous comparisons. However,
microbes can exert control over their location
through chemotaxis (104). If free-living mi-
crobes migrate to locations closer to high-
quality trading partners and then locally re-
lease their commodity, this can facilitate the
evolution of partner choice. For example,
chemotactic choice could play a role in cases
where rhizosphere microbes migrate toward
host root exudates (105, 106), providing the
most attractive host with the highest number
of microbial partners to choose from. Such
chemotactic partner choice is probably more
difficult to achieve in dense polymicrobial
biofilms than in less dense liquid environ-
ments with clear concentration gradients. To
test market-based partner discrimination in
chemotactic mutualisms, choice experiments
could test whether individuals move toward
high-quality trading partners. Experiments
could run for several generations to see
whether greater discrimination and migration
begin to evolve and under which conditions
(for instance, in biofilms vs. free-living con-
ditions or in filamentous, multicellular mi-
crobes vs. in single-celled microbes).
If partner discrimination becomes so ef-
fective that only high-quality genotypes can
survive, variations in partner quality could
ultimately be lost (107, 108). In these fixed
populations, there is no longer variability in
prices, theoretically ending market dynamics.
However, in natural systems, which are
constantly exposed to environmental vol-
atility, the best-quality genotype can vary
depending on market conditions. Such con-
text dependence could cause variation in
preferential allocation of resources to trading
partners, potentially counteracting this loss
in diversity.
In contrast, there might be microbial trad-
ing interactions where the microbial partner
cannot achieve partner choice. This could, for
instance, be the case in endosymbionts that
have no (or only limited) active horizontal
transmission. In these cases, the microbial
market would reduce to a host-controlled
monopoly (e.g., ref. 14). Partner choice
models might still be useful in these cir-
cumstances because variation in host de-
mand for particular microbial commodities
may be influenced by environmental con-
ditions, and this could be analyzed with
market theory.
How Do Markets Evolve Under Fluctua-
tions in Supply and Demand? One market
prediction that could be tested in microbial
systems is that the benefit of trade depends
not only on the interacting partners but also
on the available supply of commodities from
other sources. Analogous to primate markets,
where the number of infants and fertile
females influences the value they represent
(109, 110), microbial experiments are possi-
ble in which the abundance of a resource is
externally manipulated to change the balance
of trade costs and benefits. We predict that
biotic or abiotic conditions that influence the
demand for a particular service [e.g., a rise
in temperature if the service is heat resis-
tance (111)] will influence its value on the
microbial market: when demand is higher, a
higher price can be asked for that service.
Microbial systems are useful to study the
intricacies of this problem. This is of par-
ticular relevance for supply and demand
variations induced by climate change and
the response of mutualisms to these changes
(112). Another example is in agriculture: the
application of fertilizer can reduce the mar-
ket value of microbial mutualists providing
nutrients to plant host and thus drive a re-
duction in their reliance on mutualistic mi-
crobial partners (113, 114).
The Evolution of Microbial Markets from
Noncooperative Interactions. Evolutionary
biologists are interested in understanding the
transitions that drive facultative exchanges
into obligate ones. Microbial markets offer
a unique opportunity to reenact major tran-
sitions using experimental evolution ap-
proaches. For example, the recently intro-
duced Black Queen Hypothesis (115, 116)
suggests that the inherent leakiness of many
microbial public goods results in microbes
being selected to lose the ability to produce
certain goods themselves, as long as these
goods are provided by helper microbes in the
community. This dependence is predicted to
drive the evolutionof cooperative phenotypes
in which the beneficiary benefits the helper,
sustaining its population (115). In this way,
obligate microbial cooperative interactions,
and potentially rudimentary microbial
markets, can evolve from previously non-
cooperative interactions. Experimental evo-
lution approaches (e.g., ref. 117), can be
useful to understand the loss of traits in
microbial communities and what selection
pressures favor an increased dependence
on Black Queen markets.
Hoarding and Microbial Prudence. Pru-
dence is often associated with advanced cog-
nitive capacities, but it is not a requirement
if direct physiological responses to varying
resource levels are used to achieve real-
time collaboration (35). In the legume–
rhizobia mutualism, some rhizobial strains
use a chemical called rhizobitoxine that can
substantially increase the accumulation of
carbon [as poly-3-hydroxybutyrate (PHB)]
while reducing the growth of the legume host
and competing rhizobial strains. This helps
increase rhizobial reproduction and long-
term survival under starvation conditions
(118, 119). Recent work suggests that the
manner in which PHB resources are hoarded
is conditional, with a rhizobial strain pro-
ducing fewer high-PHB cells when low
competitor density predicts only short-term
starvation (118) and can thus be understood
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as a hoarding strategy in response to
competition. This system, and others like
Dictyostelium farming (85) and the ecto-
mycorrhizal soil fungus Morchella crassipes
farming Pseudomonas putida bacteria as a
carbon source (86), can be used to study
under what conditions scarce resources
are held, so they can be either used later
or traded for a greater profit in the future.
Applied Microbial Markets. Lastly, there is
potential applied value in using biological
market theory to help identify the conditions
under which trade is maximized for partic-
ular partners. This could have benefits in
agriculture and medicine. In agriculture,
natural selection favors microbes that max-
imize their own fitness and gain of resources
over that of their host or competitors. This
can conflict with the goals of agriculture
or other industries, where humans favor
microbes that maximize yields of their crop
hosts or other products (120). Once we have
a better understanding of the conditions un-
der which microbes transfer more resources,
we can use experimental manipulations to
select for microbes offering better market
prices to their hosts (103). Likewise in medi-
cine, an increased understanding of trade
by pathogenic microbes might be useful
to disrupt these markets and promote host
health. Recent work suggests that host part-
ner choice is important in shaping gut
microbiota composition (121), which has a
key role in shaping human and animal health
and behavior (122, 123). Do hosts use mar-
ket principles to guide their selection
of microbial partners and optimize their
gut microbiota?
Conclusion
Biological market theory offers a potentially
valuable framework for studying microbial
cooperation among species. We predict that
its primary contribution will be to generate
new experimental questions and hypotheses
in the field of social microbiology. Also, ap-
plying market theory to microbial mutual-
isms will be an important test of the ro-
bustness of market-based principles as a more
general principle of social behavior. We
identified six strategiesmicrobes use or benefit
from to optimize their success in markets.
This list will no doubt grow as researchers
uncover new ways in which microbes ma-
nipulate trade in their favor. Because they are
typically easy to manipulate, microbial mar-
kets will be useful systems for testing ques-
tions about biological markets in general
(Table 1). These include the evolution of
partner choice, responses to price fluctuations,
and identification of the market conditions
that drive specialization vs. diversification,
while simultaneously taking into account the
biological context of exchange. In the current
era of synthetic biology, a microbial market
perspective can increase our understanding of
the complex feedbacks among partners and
inspire the engineering of novel interactions.
This will both drive forward our under-
standing of microbiology and increase our
knowledge of cooperation in general.
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